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Abstract
This thesis focuses on a class of Galois eld used to achieve fast nite eld arithmetic
which we call Optimal Extension Fields (OEFs), rst introduced in [BP98]. We ex-
tend this work by presenting an adaptation of Itoh and Tsujii’s algorithm for nite
eld inversion applied to OEFs. In particular, we use the facts that the action of the
Frobenius map in GF (pm) can be computed with only m− 1 subeld multiplications
and that inverses in GF (p) may be computed cheaply using known techniques. As a
result, we show that one extension eld inversion can be computed with a logarith-
mic number of extension eld multiplications. In addition, we provide new variants
of the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm for extension eld multiplication which give a
performance increase. Further, we provide an OEF construction algorithm together
with tables of Type I and Type II OEFs along with statistics on the number of
pseudo-Mersenne primes and OEFs. We apply this new work to provide implemen-
tation results for elliptic curve cryptosystems on both DEC Alpha workstations and
Pentium-class PCs. These results show that OEFs when used with our new inversion
and multiplication algorithms provide a substantial performance increase over other
reported methods.
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Preface
This thesis represents the culmination of a child-like fascination with the world of
cryptography. On August 13-14, 1994, I was persuaded by an old friend from high
school named Rich Pell to attend a conference called Hackers on Planet Earth. This
gathering of hackers, phreakers, Feds, geeks, and other social mists was held in New
York City to mark the tenth anniversary of 2600 Magazine. We were kids fascinated
by the vulnerabilities present in the computing and ideological systems which were
so quickly changing our world.
At the conference, Bruce Schneier and Matt Blaze gave a panel discussion on
cryptography. Years before the explosion of the Internet and electronic commerce,
the eld of cryptography had not blossomed to its current state of public awareness.
They spoke about a new book by Mr. Schneier which had just been published called
Applied Cryptography.
It blew me away. It piqued my curiousity to such a degree that I nd myself six
years later writing my own thesis on the subject. I devoured Applied Cryptography in
short order and was inspired to focus my energies on doing research in cryptography.
This decision meant a return to full-time study which I’d abandoned in late 1993.
In looking for a university to resume my education, I was persuaded by Amy
Bernheisel to cast my gaze toward Massachusetts. Eventually I decided to attend WPI
starting in the fall of 1995, where a new professor had just been hired by the name of
Christof Paar, whose research interest was cryptography. Since then, Professor Paar
has been my advisor through classes, papers, and projects. Thus I got my wish to
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explore the fascinating world of cryptography, and I cannot suciently thank those
who made it possible.
So I dedicate this thesis to Rich Pell, Bruce Schneier, Matt Blaze, Amy Bern-
heisel, and Christof Paar, without whom none of this would have been necessary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since their introduction by Victor Miller [Mil86] and Neil Koblitz [Kob87], elliptic
curve cryptosystems (ECCs) have been shown to be a secure and computationally
ecient method of performing public-key operations. Our focus in the present thesis
is the ecient realization of ECCs in software. Our approach focuses on the nite eld
arithmetic required for ECCs. Finite elds are identied with the notation GF (pm),
where p is a prime and m is a positive integer. It is well known that nite elds exist
for any choice of prime p and integer m.
A standard technique in the development of symmetric-key systems has been
to design a cipher to be ecient on a particular type of computing platform. For
example, the International Data Encryption Algorithm [LM90] and RC5 [Riv95] are
designed to use operations that are ecient on desktop-class microprocessors. Simi-
larly, the NIST/ANSI Data Encryption Algorithm has been designed so that hardware
realizations are particularly ecient [NIS77] [ANS81].
We propose to take the same approach with public-key system design. ECCs
provide the user a great deal of flexibility in the choice of system parameters. Our
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underlying assumption is that some choices of p and m of a nite eld GF (pm)
are a better t for a particular computer than others. The computer systems we
are concerned with in this thesis are the microprocessors found in workstations and
desktop PCs.
Most of the previous work in this area focuses on two choices of p and m.
The case of p = 2 is especially attractive for hardware circuit design of nite eld
multipliers, since the elements of the subeld GF (2) can conveniently be represented
by the logical values \0" and \1." However, p = 2 does not oer the same computa-
tional advantages in a software implementation, since microprocessors are designed
to calculate results in units of data known as words. Traditional software algorithms
for multiplication in GF (2m) have a complexity of cm2=w steps, where w is the pro-
cessor’s word length and c is some constant greater than one. For the large values of
m required for practical public-key algorithms, multiplication in GF (2m) can be very
slow.
Similarly, prime elds GF (p) also have computational diculties on standard
computers. For example, practical elliptic curve schemes x p to be greater than
2160: Multiple machine words are required to represent elements from these elds on
general-purpose workstation microprocessors, since typical word sizes are simply not
large enough. This representation presents two computational diculties: carries
between words must be accommodated, and reduction modulo p must be performed
with operands that span multiple machine words.
Optimal Extension Fields (OEFs) as introduced in [BP98], are nite elds
of the form GF (pm); p > 2: OEFs oer considerable computational advantages by
selecting p and m specically to match the underlying hardware used to perform the
arithmetic. The previous work in this area has focused on the application of OEFs
to RISC workstations, notably the DEC Alpha microprocessor.
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This contribution extends the work in [BP98] by providing an ecient inversion
algorithm, improved formulas for extension eld multiplication, a new algorithm for
OEF construction, tables of Type I and Type II OEFs, tables of the number of OEFs
for blog pc up to 57 of the required order for ECCs, as well as statistics on the existence
of primes in short intervals. In addition, we review the work on OEFs by others since
[BP98] appeared.
Chapter 2
Previous Work
Previous work on optimization of software implementations of nite eld arithmetic
has often focused on a single cryptographic application, such as designing a fast imple-
mentation for one particular nite eld. One popular optimization for ECCs involves
the use of subelds of characteristic two. A paper due to DeWin et.al. [WBV+96]
analyzes the use of GF ((2n)m), with a focus on n = 16, m = 11. This construction
yields an extension eld with 2176 elements. The subeld GF (216) has a Cayley table
of suciently small size to t in the memory of a workstation. Optimizations for mul-
tiplication and inversion in such composite elds of characteristic two are described
in [GP97].
Schroeppel et.al. [SOOS95] report an implementation of an elliptic curve ana-
logue of Die-Hellman key exchange over GF (2155). The arithmetic is based on a
polynomial basis representation of the eld elements. Another paper by DeWin et.al.
[DMPW98] presents a detailed implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic on a desk-
top PC, with a focus on its application to digital signature schemes using the elds
GF (p) with p a 192-bit prime and GF (2191) . For ECCs over prime elds, their con-
struction uses projective coordinates to eliminate the need for inversion, along with a
4
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balanced ternary representation of the multiplicand. The work in [Bai98] and [BP98]
marks a departure from these methods and serves as a starting point for this new
research.
A great deal of work has been done in studying aspects of inversion in a nite
eld especially since inversion is the most costly of the four basic operations. In the
case of prime elds, in [Knu81], Knuth demonstrates that the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm requires :843 log2(s)+1:47 divisions in the average case, for s the element we
wish to invert. A great number of variants on Euclid’s algorithm have been developed
for use in cryptographic applications, as in [WBV+96], [LKL98], and [SOOS95].
Itoh and Tsujii present an algorithm in [IT88] for multiplicative inversion in
GF (qm) based on the idea of reducing extension eld inversion to the problem of
subeld inversion. Their method is presented in the context of normal bases, where
exponentiation to the q-th power is very ecient.
In [GP97], a version of Itoh and Tsujii’s algorithm for inversion when applied
to composite Galois elds GF (2n)m) in a polynomial basis is described which serves
as the basis for our development of a variant of this method applied to OEFs.
Lee et.al. [LKL98] provide an implementation of OEFs using a choice of p
less than 216. The authors present a new inversion algorithm they call the Modied
Almost Inverse Algorithm (MAIA) which is especially suited for OEFs. Their choice
of p of this size allows for the use of look-up tables for subeld inversion.
Kobayashi et.al. present in [KMKH99] a method of OEF inversion which is
based on a direct solution of a set of linear equations. The method is ecient for
small values of m.
Chapter 3
Optimal Extension Fields
In the following, we dene a class of nite elds, which we call Optimal Extension
Fields (OEFs). To simplify matters, we introduce a name for a class of prime numbers:
Denition 1 Let c be a positive rational integer. A pseudo-Mersenne prime is a
prime number of the form 2n  c; log2 c  b12nc.
We now dene an OEF:
Denition 2 An Optimal Extension Field is a nite eld GF (pm) such that:
1. p is a pseudo-Mersenne prime,
2. An irreducible binomial P (x) = xm − ! exists over GF (p).
The following theorem from [LN83] describes the cases when an irreducible
binomial exists:
Theorem 1 Let m  2 be an integer and ! 2 GF (p). Then the binomial xm−! is
irreducible in GF (p)[x] if and only if the following two conditions are satised:
6
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(i) each prime factor of m divides the order e of ! over GF (p); but not (p− 1)=e;
(ii) p  1 mod 4 if m  0 mod 4.
An important corollary is given in [Jun93]:
Corollary 1 Let ! be a primitive element for GF (p) and let m be a divisor of p− 1.
Then xm − ! is an irreducible polynomial.
We observe that there are two special cases of OEF which yield additional
arithmetic advantages, which we call Type I and Type II.
Denition 3 A Type I OEF has p = 2n  1.
A Type I OEF allows for subeld modular reduction with very low complexity.
For ECCs in practice, particularly good choices of p are 231 − 1 and 261 − 1.
Denition 4 A Type II OEF has an irreducible binomial xm − 2.
As will be shown in Section 4.2.1, a Type II OEF allows for a reduction in
the complexity of extension eld modular reduction since the multiplications by ! in
Theorem 2 can be implemented using shifts instead of explicit multiplications.
The range of possible m for a given p depends on the factorization of p − 1
due to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
Chapter 4
Optimal Extension Field
Arithmetic
This section describes the previous work on arithmetic in OEFs. Our new method for
inversion is treated separately in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, improved multiplication
algorithms are introduced. In Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, the operations of multiplication
and modular reduction in the subeld are discussed. Some of the material of this
section is described in previous work, and appears here solely for completeness of
presentation.
An OEF GF (pm) is isomorphic to GF (p)[x]=(P (x)), where P (x) = xm +Pm−1
i=0 pi x
i; pi 2 GF (p), is a monic irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF (p).
In the following, a residue class will be identied with the polynomial of least degree
in this class. We consider a standard (or polynomial or canonical) basis representation
of a eld element A(x) 2 GF (pm):
A(x) = am−1xm−1 +   + a1x+ a0; (4.1)
8
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where ai 2 GF (p). Since we choose p to be less than the processor’s word size, we
can represent A(x) with m registers, each containing one ai.
All arithmetic operations are performed modulo the eld polynomial. The
choice of eld polynomial determines the complexity of the modular reduction.
4.1 Addition and Subtraction
Addition and subtraction of two eld elements is implemented in a straightforward
manner by adding or subtracting the coecients of their polynomial representation
and if necessary, performing a modular reduction by subtracting or adding p once
from the intermediate result.
4.2 Multiplication
Field multiplication can be performed in two stages. First, we perform an ordinary
polynomial multiplication of two eld elements A(x) and B(x), resulting in an inter-
mediate product C 0(x) of degree less than or equal to 2m− 2:
C 0(x) = A(x)B(x) = c02m−2x2m−2 +   + c01x+ c00; c0i 2 GF (p): (4.2)
The schoolbook method to calculate the coecients c0i; i = 0; 1; : : : ; 2m − 2;
requires m2 multiplications and (m− 1)2 additions in the subeld GF (p).
In Section 4.2.1 we present an ecient method to calculate the residue C(x) 
C 0(x) mod P (x); C(x) 2 GF (pm). Section 6 shows ways to reduce the number of
coecient multiplications required.
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Squaring can be considered a special case of multiplication. The only dierence
is that the number of coecient multiplications can be reduced to m(m+ 1)=2.
In order to perform coecient multiplications, we must multiply in the sub-
eld. Methods for fast subeld multiplication were noted in [MA85] and [BP98]. For
the case of a Type I OEF, we require a single integer multiplication to implement the
subeld multiply, whereas with a general OEF we require three.
4.2.1 Extension Field Modular Reduction
After performing a multiplication of eld elements in a polynomial representation, we
obtain the intermediate result C 0(x). In general the degree of C 0(x) will be greater
than or equal to m. In this case, we need to perform a modular reduction. The
canonical method to carry out this calculation is long polynomial division with re-
mainder by the eld polynomial. However, eld polynomials of special form allow for
computational eciencies in the modular reduction.
Since monomials xm;m > 1 are obviously always reducible, we turn our atten-
tion to irreducible binomials. An OEF has by denition a eld polynomial of the form
P (x) = xm−!. The use of an irreducible binomial as a eld polynomial yields major
computational advantages as will be shown below. Observe that irreducible binomials
do not exist over GF (2). Modular reduction with a binomial can be performed with
the following complexity:
Theorem 2 Given a polynomial C 0(x) over GF (p) of degree less than or equal to
2m − 2; C 0(x) can be reduced modulo P (x) = xm − ! requiring at most m− 1 multi-
plications by ! and m− 1 additions, where both of these operations are performed in
GF (p):
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A general expression for the reduced polynomial is given by:
C(x)  c0m−1xm−1 + [!c02m−2 + c0m−2]xm−2 +    + [!c0m + c00] mod P (x) (4.3)
As an optimization, when possible we choose those elds with an irreducible
binomial xm − 2, allowing us to implement the multiplications as shifts. OEFs that
oer this optimization are known as Type II OEFs.
4.2.2 Fast Subeld Multiplication
As shown above, fast subeld multiplication is essential for fast multiplication in
GF (pm). Subeld arithmetic in GF (p) is implemented with standard modular integer
techniques. We recall that multiplication of two elements a; b 2 GF (p) is performed
by a  b  c (mod p). Modern workstation CPUs are optimized to perform integer
arithmetic on operands of size up to the width of their registers. An OEF takes
advantage of this fact by constructing subelds whose elements may be represented
by integers in a single register. For example, on a workstation with 64-bit registers,
the largest prime we may represent is 264 − 59. So we choose a prime p  264− 59 as
the characteristic of our subeld on this computer. To this end, we recommend the
use of Galois elds with subelds as large as possible while still within single-precision
limits of our host CPU.
We perform multiplication of two single-word integers and in general obtain
a double-word integer result. In order to nish the calculation, we must perform a
modular reduction. Obtaining a remainder after division of two integers is a well-
studied problem [MA85]. Many methods such as Barrett Reduction exist which oer
computational advantages over traditional long division on integers. These methods,
however, are still slow when compared to multiplication of single-word integers. Our
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choice of p allows a far less complex modular reduction operation.
4.2.3 Fast Subeld Modular Reduction
A technique due to Mohan and Adiga shows that fast modular reduction is possible
for moduli of the form 2n  c, where c is a \small" integer [MA85]. Integers of this
form allow modular reduction without division. We present a form of such a modular
reduction algorithm, adapted from [MA85] and [MvOV97]. This algorithm addresses
only the primes of the form 2n − c, although trivial change to the allows the use of
primes 2n + c.
The operators << and >> are taken to mean \left shift" and \right shift"
respectively.
Algorithm 1 Fast Subeld Modular Reduction
Require: p = 2n − c; log2 c  12n; x < p2 is the integer to reduce
Ensure: r  x (mod p)
q0  x >> n
r0  x− q02n
r r0
i 0
while qi > 0 do
qi+1  qic >> n
ri+1  qic− (qi+1 << n)
i i+ 1
r r + ri
end while
while r  p do
r r − p
end while
To understand the operation of this algorithm, consider the following graphical
representation of the situation:
OEF Arithmetic 13
 
c
ai
b
 j
0n  n-1
n bits
2n
 jbix = a q 0 r 0
n/2 bits
In this example, we begin with two subeld elements ai and bj, which are of
size less than 2n, where 2n − 1 is the maximum integer we can represent in a single
machine register, and c is as in the above algorithm. We form the product x = aibj
which is of size less than 22n, but in general larger than 2n, and by implication larger
than p. So we use the above algorithm to perform a modular reduction.
We let r0 be the lower n bits of the product aibj and the remaining upper bits
q0. We observe that 2n (mod p)  c so we may write the following:
q0; r0  2n − c
x = aibj = 2
nq0 + r0
2n = [1](2n − c) + [c]
2n  c (mod (p = 2n − c))
r = x  cq0 + r0 (mod p)
This is the situation depicted in the next gure.
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n bits
r
r0 
c * q 0
n+1 0
  (mod 2 n -c)
In general, this new expression for the residue class is still larger than 2n, and
by implication larger than p. So we repeat this process once more, again rewriting
the equations and replacing 2n by c:
r  cq1 + r1 = 2nq1 + r1  cq1 + r1 (mod p)
This new situation is depicted in the following gure:
0
r
c*q 1
r
n+1 bits
n+2
Finally we have an expression for the residue of aibj that in general is less than
2n+2. To complete the reduction, we may need to subtract p from the intermediate
result r one or more times. We simply test for this case and we have completed the
reduction.
Modular reduction with this algorithm requires only two multiplications by
c, six shifts by n, and six additions and subtractions, when p is a pseudo-Mersenne
prime. In practice, this leads to a dramatic performance increase over performing
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explicit division with remainder. For example, when p = 232 − 5, m = 5, and we
implement subeld reduction by performing an explicit division with remainder on
a 500 MHz DEC Alpha CPU, we require 7.74 sec for a multiplication in GF (pm).
When we perform modular reduction using this algorithm, we require only 1.35 sec,
a vefold savings.
If c = 1, this algorithm executes the rst while loop only once. To observe
this behavior, we simply set c = 1 in the algorithm and walk through the algorithm:
q0  x >> n
r0  x− (q0 << n)
r r0
i 0
q1  (q0  1 >> n) = 0
r1  (q0 − 0)
r r0 + r1
At this point, the algorithm terminates since q1 = 0, and we may rewrite this result
as:
x (mod 2n − 1)  x− ((x >> n) << n) + (x >> n)
In this special case, no multiplications are required for the modular reduction
and the entire operation may be performed with two shifts and two adds if the in-
termediate result is contained in a single word. This is a substantial improvement
over the c > 1 case. An OEF that oers this optimization is known as Type I. In
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our implementation as reported in Section 8, we have included p = 261 − 1 for this
reason. Our implementation takes advantage of its special form, making p = 261 − 1
the best performing choice of p we consider.
4.3 Inversion Method: The Extended Euclidean
Algorithm
In [LKL98], the authors propose a method for inversion which we include here for
completeness. Our method for inversion is treated in Chapter 5 and is based on an
entirely dierent approach. The material of these sections on Euclidean approaches
to extension eld inversion is presented in [LKL98].
Traditionally, inversion methods have been based on either Fermat’s Little
Theorem or the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA). The Almost Inverse Algorithm
(AIA), introduced in [SOOS95], is a variant of the EEA, and is treated in Section 4.4.
The EEA for Polynomials is found in Algorithm 2 [LKL98]. Capital letters
denote extension eld elements while lowercase letters denote subeld elements and
integers. The subscript on a subeld element indicates which coecient of the poly-
nomial is to be selected.
The algorithm proceeds by adding multiples of the shorter of F (x) and G(x)
to the longer [LKL98]. This action reduces the degree of the larger polynomial by at
least one. With probability (p− 1)=p, the degree of the larger polynomial is reduced
by two, and so on. Thus for purposes of analysis we may safely assume that each
iteration of the algorithm reduces the degree of the larger polynomial by one. The
process is repeated until F (x) 2 GF (p) or G(x) 2 GF (p). A(x) in the worst case will
have degree m− 1, while P (x) will always have degree m. Thus it is clear that in the
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Algorithm 2 Extended Euclidean Algorithm for Polynomials [LKL98]
Require: A(x) 2 GF (pm); P (x) is the eld polynomial
Ensure: A(x)B(x)  1 2 GF (pm)
B(x) 0; C(x) 1; G(x)  A(x)
while deg(P (x) 6= 0) do
if deg(P (x)) < deg(G(x)) then
exchange P (x) with G(x) and B(x) with C(x)
end if
j  deg(P (x))− deg(G(x))
 −pdeg(P (x))=gdeg(G(x))
P (x) P (x) + xjG(x)
B(x) B(x) + xjC(x)
end while
B(x) B(x)=p0
worst case 2(m− 1) iterations are required.
Each iteration of the algorithm requires a subeld inverse. If the subeld
GF (p) is small enough, a table of inverses may be precomputed or stored. Otherwise,
an algorithm such as the EEA must be run to determine the inverse. Thus this method
is useful for those cases where enough storage exists to store a table of inverses. In
particular, this is possible for p  232 on a workstation. The remaining methods in
this section are also subject to this restriction. Our method in Section 5 overcomes
this restriction while maintaining fast performance.
4.4 Inversion Method: The Almost Inverse Algo-
rithm
The Almost Inverse Algorithm [SOOS95] [LKL98] oers a variant on the EEA which
is advantageous in particular circumstances. For example, [SOOS95] shows a perfor-
mance gain when used in the eld GF (2155). In particular, the EEA nds polynomials
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B(x) and U(x) such that A(x)B(x) +P (x)U(x)  1 2 GF (pm). In contrast, the AIA
modies the EEA to nd A(x)B(x) +P (x)U(x)  xk. The inversion is completed by
computing B(x) B(x)=xk. The algorithm is found as Algorithm 3 [LKL98].
Algorithm 3 Almost Inverse Algorithm [LKL98]
Require: A(x) 2 GF (pm); P (x) is the eld polynomial
Ensure: A(x)B(x)  1 2 GF (pm)
k  0; B(x) 0; C(x) 1; G(x) A(x)
while xjP (x) do
P (x) P (x)=x
C(x) C(x)x
k k + 1
end while
while deg(P (x) 6= 0) do
if deg(P (x)) < deg(G(x)) then
exchange P (x) with G(x) and B(x) with C(x)
end if
 −p0=g0
P (x) P (x) + G(x)
B(x) B(x) + C(x)
end while
B(x) B(x)=p0
B(x) B(x)=xk
In GF (2m) in polynomial basis, the multiplication by xj is implemented with
bitwise shifts. The AIA eliminates the need for these shifts. In addition, the algorithm
reduces the degree of P (x) when deg(P (x)) = deg(G(x)), thus saving iterations.
In contrast with the EEA, which saves iterations with probability only 1=p, this
algorithm saves iterations roughly 20% of the time.
However, these advantages are only present in elds of the form GF (2m). Lee,
et.al. present a variant of the AIA which oers comparable advantages to elds of
the form GF (pm) in [LKL98].
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4.5 Inversion Methods: Modied Almost Inverse
Algorithm
While the EEA works from highest coecients down to lowest and the AIA works
from lowest to highest, the MAIA [LKL98] works on the lowest and highest in the
same iteration. However, the total number of operations is almost identical to the
EEA. The advantage to this method is that the number of iterations and hence the
number of polynomial scalar multiplications are reduced by half.
The algorithm is given as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Modied Almost Inverse Algorithm [LKL98]
Require: A(x) 2 GF (pm); P (x) is the eld polynomial
Ensure: A(x)B(x)  1 2 GF (pm)
k  0; B(x) 0; C(x) 1; G(x) A(x)
while xjP (x) do
P (x) P (x)=x
C(x) C(x)x
k k + 1
end while
while deg(P (x) 6= 0) do
if deg(P (x)) < deg(G(x)) then
exchange P (x) with G(x) and B(x) with C(x)
end if
j  deg(P (x))− deg(G(x))
  −p0=g0
if j 6= 0 then
 −pdeg(P (x))=gdeg(G(x))
else
 0
end if
P (x) P (x) + (xj + )G(x)
B(x) B(x) + (xj + )C(x)
end while
B(x) B(x)=p0
B(x) B(x)=xk
Chapter 5
Optimal Extension Field Inversion
The inversion algorithm for OEFs is based on the observation that the inversion
algorithm due to Itoh and Tsujii may be eciently realized in the context of OEFs.
In fact, we show that the inversion method is particularly suited to nite elds in
polynomial basis that have a binomial as the eld polynomial.
The Itoh and Tsujii Inversion (ITI) [IT88] reduces the problem of extension
eld inversion to subeld inversion. This reduction relies on a special mapping that
is dened for all nite elds. In particular, the norm function maps elements of the
extension eld to the subeld by raising them to the (pm − 1)=(p− 1) power [LN83].
In previous reported applications of ITI [GP97], researchers have used look-up tables
to perform the subeld inversion. While this approach is ecient, it is also quite
limited. For a choice of p less than 216, tables easily t in the storage of modern
desktop PCs and workstations. However, a choice of p of approximately 232 or 264
leads to tables which are simply too large. Our implementation computes the subeld
inverse using the Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm [Nor86]. We show that an
ecient implementation of this algorithm is fast enough to make ITI suitable for
OEFs.
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We outline our version of the ITI here. Our objective is to nd an element
A−1(x) such that A(x)A−1(x)  1 mod P (x).
One method for evaluating the norm of an element is to apply the binary
method of exponentiation [Knu81] or one of its improved derivatives [MvOV97]. Such
straightforward methods are very costly. Clearly, a faster method would be preferable.
Fortunately, we can use the Frobenius map to quickly evaluate the norm function.
5.1 Properties of the Frobenius Map on an OEF
Denition 5 Let  2 GF (pm). Then the mapping  ! p is an automorphism
known as the Frobenius map.
As noted in [Bas84], the ith iterate of the Frobenius map  ! pi is also an
automorphism. Let us consider the action of an arbitrary iterate i of the Frobenius
map on an arbitrary element of GF (pm) : A(x)pi =
P
apij x
jpi, for aj 2 GF (p): We
know by Fermat’s Little Theorem that apj  aj mod p. Thus the aj coecients are
xed points of Frobenius map iterates and we can write:
Ap
i
(x)  am−1x(m−1)pi +   + a1xpi + a0 mod P (x) (5.1)
Now we need to consider the elements which are not kept xed by the action
of the Frobenius map: (xj)p; 0 < j < m. We can express these as xjp. But this
expression is always a polynomial with a single non-zero term due to the following
theorem (see also [KMKH99]):
Theorem 3 Let P (x) be an irreducible polynomial of the form P (x) = xm − ! over
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GF (p), e an integer, x 2 GF (p)[x]. Then:
xe  !qxs mod P (x) (5.2)
where s  e mod m with q = e−s
m
:
Proof 1 First, we observe that xm  ! mod P (x): Now,
xe = xqm+s (5.3)
where q and s are dened above. Then:
xe = xqmxs  !qxs mod P (x) (5.4)
2
We have the following corollary which is of especial interest in our case of
applying iterates of the Frobenius map:
Corollary 2
(xj)p
i  !qxj mod P (x) (5.5)
where xj 2 GF (p)[x], i is an arbitrary positive rational integer, and other variables
are dened in Theorem 3.
Proof 2 Since P (x) is an irreducible binomial, by Theorem 1, mj(p − 1), which
implies p = (p− 1) + 1  1 mod m. Thus s  jpi  j mod m. 2
Note that all xjp
i
; 1  j; i  m − 1 in Equation (5.1) can be precomputed if
P (x) is given. Given the above, to compute (ajxj)p
i
we need only a single subeld
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multiplication. Thus, we can raise A(x) to the pi-th power using only m− 1 subeld
multiplications if we make use of Corollary 2 and the precomputed values of xjp; 1 
j  m− 1.
Consider p = 231 − 1, P (x) = x6 − 7. Using Corollary 2, we can precompute
the values needed for the subeld multiplications for both the p and p2 case. These
are found in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Precomputed inversion constants for GF ((231− 1)6) with eld polynomial
P (x) = x6 − 7
xp mod P (x)  1513477736 x xp2 mod P (x)  1513477735 x
x2p mod P (x)  1513477735 x2 x2p2 mod P (x)  634005911 x2
x3p mod P (x)  −1 x3 x3p2 mod P (x)  x3
x4p mod P (x)  634005911 x4 x4p2 mod P (x)  1513477735 x4
x5p mod P (x)  634005912 x5 x5p2 mod P (x)  634005911 x5
5.2 Itoh and Tsujii Inversion for OEFs
Returning now to the problem of inverting non-zero elements in an OEF, recall that
we observed (p
m−1)=(p−1) 2 GF (p). We begin with a simple algebraic substitution:
A−1(x) = (Ar)−1(x)Ar−1(x); r =
pm − 1
p− 1 (5.6)
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Algorithm 5 describes the procedure for computing the inverse according to
Equation (5.6). In the following, we will address the individual steps of the algorithm.
Capital letters denote extension eld elements while lowercase letters denote subeld
elements.
Algorithm 5 Optimal Extension Field Inversion
Require: A(x) 2 GF (pm)
Ensure: A(x)B(x)  1 mod P (x); B(x) = P bixi
B(x) A(x)
Use an addition chain to compute B(x) B(x)r−1
c0  B(x)A(x)
c c−10
B(x) B(x)c
The core of the algorithm is an exponentiation to the r-th power. We have
the following power series representation for r:
r = pm−1 + pm−2 +   + p + 1: (5.7)
Thus, we have the p-adic representation r − 1 = (11 : : : 10)p. To evaluate our
expression in Equation (5.6), we require an ecient method to evaluate Ar−1(x). For
a given eld, r− 1 will be xed. Thus, our problem is to raise a general element to a
xed exponent. One popular method of doing this is an addition chain.
From analogous results in [GP97] and [IT88], we see that using such an addi-
tion chain constructed from the p-adic representation of r − 1 requires:
#general multiplications = blog2(m− 1)c+HW (m− 1)− 1 (5.8)
#Frobenius maps = blog2(m− 1)c+HW (m− 1) (5.9)
where HW is the Hamming weight of the operand.
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Given the inversion constants in Table 5.1, we can now present an addition
chain for this eld. We compute Ar−1(x) as shown in Algorithm 6. In this algorithm,
all exponents are understood to be expressed in base p for clarity. This example
requires three exponentiations to the p-th power, one exponentiation to the p2-th
power and three general multiplications, as predicted by Equation (5.8).
Algorithm 6 Addition Chain for Ar−1 in GF ((231 − 1)6)
Require: A 2 GF (pm)
Ensure: B  Ar−1 mod P (x)
B  Ap = A(10)
B0  BA = A(11)
B  Bp20 = A(1100)
B  BB0 = A(1111)
B  Bp = A(11110)
B  BA = A(11111)
B  Bp = A(111110)
We observe that A(x)r is always an element of GF (p) due to the form chosen
for r. Thus, to compute its inverse according to Equation 5.6, we use a single-
precision implementation of the Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm. At this point
in our development of the OEF inversion algorithm, we have computed A(x)r−1 and
(A(x)r)−1. Multiplying these two elements gives A(x)−1 and we are done.
In terms of computational complexity, the critical operations are the computa-
tions of A(x)r−1 and c−10 . To compute A(x)
r−1, we require blog2(m−1)c+Hw(m−1)−1
general multiplications and blog2(m − 1)c + Hw(m − 1) exponentiations to a pi-th
power. Since the computation of c0 results in a constant polynomial, we only need m
subeld multiplications and a multiplication by !; as given in the following formula,
where we take A(x) =
P
aixi and B(x) =
P
bixi:
c0 = !(a1bm−1 +   + am−1b1) + (a0b0)
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Further, in the last step of Algorithm 5, since c is also a constant polynomial, we only
need m subeld multiplications.
Each exponentiation to a pi-th power requires m− 1 subeld multiplications.
Each general polynomial multiplication requires m2 +m− 1 subeld multiplications
including those for modular reduction. Thus a general expression for the complexity
of this algorithm in terms of subeld multiplications is:
#SM = [blog2(m− 1)c +Hw(m− 1)](m− 1)
+ [blog2(m− 1)c +Hw(m− 1) − 1](m2 +m− 1) + 2m (5.10)
The subeld inverse may be computed by any method. Since elements of the
subeld t into a single register, any method for single-precision inversion may be
used. Our experience indicates that the Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm is the
superior choice for p  231 and p  261. Of course, for smaller choices of p, one may
use a precomputed table of subeld inverses.
Finally we note that for small values of m, in particular m = 3, the direct
inversion method in [KMKH99] requires somewhat fewer subeld multiplications.
However, a subeld inverse is also required.
Chapter 6
Fast Polynomial Multiplication
Polynomial multiplication is required to implement both the elliptic curve group op-
eration and the algorithm for inversion given in Section 5. In this section, we give
a method to reduce the complexity of polynomial multiplication. The method is
related to Karatsuba’s method [Knu81], but is optimized for multiplication of poly-
nomials with 3i coecients, for i a positive integer. We observe that OEFs with
m = 3 and m = 6 are well suited for 64-bit and 32-bit processors, respectively. For
polynomial degrees that are relevant for ECCs, we show that on Intel microproces-
sors, this method yields a 10% reduction in the time required for the overall scalar
multiplication.
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6.1 Polynomials of Degree 2
Consider the degree-2 polynomials:
A(x) = a2x
2 + a1x+ a0
B(x) = b2x
2 + b1x+ b0
The product of A(x) and B(x) is given by:
C 0(x) =
4X
i=0
c0ix
i = A(x)B(x) = [a2b2]x
4 + [a2b1 + a1b2]x
3 +
[a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2]x
2 + [a1b0 + a0b1]x+ [a0b0]
Using the schoolbook method for polynomial multiplication, we require nine inner
products. However, we can derive a more ecient method. We dene the following
auxiliary products:
D0 = a0b0
D1 = a1b1
D2 = a2b2
D3 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1)
D4 = (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2)
D5 = (a1 + a2)(b1 + b2)
We can construct the coecients of C 0(x) from the Di terms using only addi-
Fast Multiplication 29
tions and subtractions:
c00 = D0
c01 = D3 −D1 −D0 = (a0b0 + a0b1 + a1b0 + a1b1)− a1b1 − a0b0
c02 = D4 −D2 −D0 +D1 = (a0b0 + a2b0 + a0b2 + a2b2)− a2b2 − a0b0 + a1b1
c03 = D5 −D1 −D2 = (a1b1 + a1b2 + a2b1 + a2b2)− a1b1 − a2b2
c04 = D2
Thus, the only multiplications that are needed are in the Di products. The
complexity of this method is:
#MUL #ADD
schoolbook 9 4
new 6 6 + 7 = 13
where we treat subtractions as additions. Thus, with this method, we are able to
trade multiplications for additions and subtractions. On most microprocessors, the
operation of addition is much faster than multiplication. However, on digital signal
processors, for example, the number of cycles required for a multiplication is often
the same as those required for an addition. It is useful, then, to develop a simple
timing model for both multiplication methods.
Let r = TMUL=TADD on a given platform, where TMUL and TADD are the time
required for a subeld multiplication and a subeld addition, respectively. We rst
analyze the schoolbook method of polynomial multiplication. The time complexity
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of this algorithm is given by:
TSB = 9TMUL + 4TADD = (9r + 4)TADD (6.1)
Then the time complexity of the Karatsuba variant is given by:
TK = 6TMUL + 13TADD = (6r + 13)TADD (6.2)
Given these relationships, it is useful to consider for which values of r this
method is of advantage. Specically, we want the values of r for which TSB > TK .
TSB > TK
(9r + 4)TADD = (6r + 13)TADD
r = 3
As a rough guideline we can conclude that this new method is of advantage
when the ratio of multiplication time to addition time is greater than or equal to
three. Of course, when using a superscalar processor, the value of r may depend not
only on the cycle counts for multiplication and addition, but also on the data flow
dependencies in the code. Some processors may have multiple functional units avail-
able to compute additions and only one multiplier, for instance. On such a system, if
it is possible to fully utilize all functional units, the operation of addition in eect is
speeded up by the ability to perform additions in parallel. This is true even if a mul-
tiplication and addition each consume the same number of cycles. The possibility of
instruction-level parallelism must be taken into account when determining a suitable
value for r.
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6.2 Polynomials of Degree 5
Given the above algorithm to compute the product of polynomials of degree 2, we
can formulate a procedure to compute the product of polynomials of degree 5. This
algorithm combines the degree-2 method in Section 6.1 with a single iteration of the
Karatsuba method [Knu81]. As above, we consider the general polynomials:
A(x) =
5X
i=0
aix
i = (a5x
2 + a4x+ a3) x
3 + (a2x
2 + a1x+ a0) = Ah(x) x
3 +Al(x)
B(x) =
5X
i=0
bix
i = (b5x
2 + b4x+ b3) x
3 + (b2x
2 + b1x+ b0) = Bh(x) x
3 +Bl(x)
In this way, we decompose each degree-5 polynomial into two degree-2 poly-
nomials in the indeterminate x3. We dene the auxiliary products:
E0(x) = Al(x)Bl(x)
E1(x) = (Ah(x) +Al(x))(Bh(x) +Bl(x))
E2(x) = AhBh
Then our product C 0(x) is given by:
C 0(x) = E2(x) x6 + [E1(x)− E0(x)− E2(x)] x3 + E0(x) (6.3)
As above, the only multiplications required are in the auxiliary products Ei.
The key idea is to compute E0(x); E1(x); and E2(x), with the method for multiplica-
tion of degree-2 polynomials described in Section 6.1.
We observe that there is some overlap which must be resolved betweenE2(x) x6,
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[E1(x) − E0(x) − E2(x)] x3, and E0(x). E2(x) x6 is an expression of the form
10x10 + 9x9 + 8x8 + 7x7 + 6x6, while [E1(x)− E0(x)− E2(x)] x3 has the form
7x7 + 6x6 + 5x5 + 4x4 + 3x3, and we have to compute two subeld additions
to obtain the result. A similar situation arises with [E1(x) − E0(x) − E2(x)] x3 and
E0(x). Thus in total we require 4 subeld additions to construct the result on top of
the 10 subeld subtractions needed for [E1(x)− E0(x)−E2(x)].
As above, we consider the complexity of this algorithm:
#MUL #ADD
schoolbook 62 = 36 (6− 1)2 = 25
new 3 6 = 18 3 13 + (3 + 3) + (5 + 5) + 4 = 59
Similarly, we solve for r to determine the break even point:
TSB > TADD
(36r + 25)TADD = (18r + 59)TADD
r =
34
18
 2
Thus we see that the break even point is lower for degree-5 polynomials than for
degree-2 polynomials. Our computational experiments indicate that on a 233 MHz
Pentium/MMX, use of this polynomial multiplication procedure yields a 20% speedup
over the time required for a polynomial multiplication using the schoolbook method.
Use of this procedure yields a 10% speedup in the overall scalar multiplication time.
Chapter 7
Fast Scalar Multiplication
In [KMKH99], the authors present an optimization for OEFs which applies to certain
elliptic curves. The content of this section is a discussion of their work. An elliptic
curve over GF (pm); p > 3, is an equation of the form:
E : y2  x3 + ax+ b
where a; b 2 GF (pm). The optimization in [KMKH99] applies when a; b 2 GF (p).
In this case, the Frobenius map, as described in Section 5.1 is an endomorphism on
the curve and thus if (x; y) 2 E=GF (pm), then (xp; yp) 2 E=GF (pm). In Section 5.1,
methods are described for ecient evaluation of iterates of the Frobenius map.
Scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve is an operation of the form kP for an
integer k and curve point P . That is, kP is the addition of P to itself k times. The
canonical methods for exponentiation including the binary method [Knu81] may be
used to speed this operation. Given our Frobenius endomorphism which we denote
by , however, we can improve over these methods.
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The Frobenius endomorphism on an elliptic curve satisifes the equation
2 − t+ p = 0;−2pp  t  2pp: (7.1)
The quantity t is called the trace of Frobenius and is dened by [BSS99]:
#E=GF (pm) = pm + 1− t
Thus we can expand our multiplier as
k =
lX
i=0
ui
i (7.2)
where −p
2
 ui  p2 : In this equation, l will be roughly 2m+ 3 [KMKH99].
Then, as in Section 5.1 we can exponentiate using this -adic representation
of the multiplier.
However, since ui may grow as large as
p
2
, this observation is mainly helpful
only when p is very small, such as p = 2; 3. In order to adapt this method to be
eective for larger p, [KMKH99] presents a table look-up method, which is found as
Algorithm 7. The symbol O denotes the Point at Innity on the elliptic curve.
The algorithm proceeds by rst nding a -adic representation for k as in
Equation 7.2. This task is accomplished in the rst while loop using Equation 7.1.
Next the -adic representation for k is optimized with two operations. The
rst reduces its length from 2m+3 digits to m digits. This reduction is accomplished
due to the fact that the m-th iteration of the Frobenius map is the Identity map.
Thus we can use the rule m  1 2 EndE to perform a modular reduction on the
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Algorithm 7 Base- Scalar Multiplication Procedure
Require: k an integer, P 2 E=GF (pm); p; t
Ensure: Q = kP
i 0; x k; y  0; uj  0
while x 6= 0 or y 6= 0 do
ui x mod p
v  (x− ui)=p
x tv + y
y  −v
i i+ 1
end while
for 0  i < m do
di  ui + ui+m + ui+2m
end for
for 0  i < m do
ci di − z, where z is an integer that minimizes
P
iHW (ci)
end for
for 0  i < m do
Pi  iP
end for
Q O
Q 2Q
j  dlog2 pe + 1
while j  0 do
for 0  i < m− 1 do
if cij = 1 then
Q Q+ Pi
end if
end for
j  j − 1
end while
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-adic representation. Thus:
d2 logp ke+3X
i=0
ui
i =
m−1X
i=0
(ui + ui+m + ui+2m)
i (7.3)
=
m−1X
i=0
di
i: (7.4)
In addition, we can reduce the number of 1s in the 2-adic representation of the digits
in the -adic representation of k since [KMKH99]:
m−1X
i=0
i = 0: (7.5)
The algorithm nishes by building a table of the iterates of the Frobenius
map applied to the base point P . It then computes the scalar multiplication of P
by the optimized -adic representation for k. For the case of m = 7, the authors
report an 68% reduction in the number of elliptic curve operations required from
approximately 10:5dlog2 pe to 3:4dlog2 pe. The net result on a 400 MHz Pentium/II
in the eld GF ((231 − 1)7) is a full scalar multiplication time of 1.95 msec.
Chapter 8
Implementation Results
One of the most important applications of our technique is in elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems, where Galois eld arithmetic performance is critical to the performance of the
entire system. We show that an OEF yields substantially faster software nite eld
arithmetic than those previously reported in the literature.
We implemented our algorithms on two platforms. One platform is the DEC
Alpha 21064 and 21164A workstations. These RISC computers have a 64-bit archi-
tecture. Thus a good choice for p would be 261 − 1 with an extension degree m = 3
since an ECC over a eld of approximately 2183 elements appears quite secure. This
implementation is written in optimized C. In addition, we found that the performance
of the subeld inverse depended heavily on the organization of branches in the code.
A reduction in the number of branches at the expense of copying data proved to
be eective in reducing run time. For the DEC Alpha implementation, using our
polynomial multiplication formulas presented in Section 6.1 yields a 30% speedup on
the 21164A and a 25% speedup on the 21064. Thus, the times reported here for the
operations that rely on multiplication use the methods from Section 6.
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In addition, we implemented our algorithms on a 233 MHz Intel Pentium MMX
using Microsoft Visual C++ version 6.0. This computer has a 32-bit architecture.
Thus a good choice for p would be 231− 1 with an extension degree m = 6 yielding a
nite eld with approximately 2186 elements. The Pentium implementation is entirely
in C. Because of the larger extension degree required on the Pentium, we observe a
roughly 20% speedup due to the formulas in Section 6, which is reflected in the timings
reported here.
For our implementation of EC scalar point multiplication, we used the sliding
window method with a maximum window size of 5. In addition, we used non-adjacent
form balanced ternary to represent the multiplicand [KT92]. To represent the coor-
dinates of points on the curve, we used an ane representation since inversion in an
OEF can be performed at moderate cost. In contrast, previous work [BP98] has re-
ported performance numbers using projective coordinates to represent points, thereby
avoiding the need to perform inversion.
In order to obtain accurate timings, we executed full scalar multiplication with
random multiplicand one thousand times, observed the execution time, and computed
the average.
The other arithmetic operations for which we report timings were executed
one million times. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 shows the result of our timing measurements.
We observe that the ratio of multiplication time to inversion time is highly
platform-dependent. On the Alpha 21064, we see a ratio of approximately 5.3. On
the Alpha 21164A, we have a ratio of approximately 7.9. On the Intel Pentium,
we have a ratio of 5.5. In each of these cases, the ratio is low enough to provide
improved performance when compared with a projective space representation of the
curve points.
As a nal remark, we observe that for some processors, it may be still be
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Table 8.1: OEF arithmetic timings in sec on DEC Alpha microprocessors for the
eld GF ((261 − 1)3) with eld polynomial P (x) = x3 − 5
Alpha 21064, 150 MHz Alpha 21164A, 600
MHz
Schoolbook Multiplica-
tion
3.67 0.48
Karatsuba-variant Multi-
plication
2.77 0.34
GF (p) inverse 8.13 1.81
GF (pm) inverse 14.6 2.68
Ane EC addition 26.1 4.45
Ane EC doubling 30.5 4.79
Ane point multiplica-
tion
6.57 msec 1.06 msec
Table 8.2: OEF arithmetic timings in sec on Intel microprocessors for the eld
GF ((231 − 1)6) with eld polynomial P (x) = x6 − 7
Pentium/MMX, 233 MHz
Schoolbook Multiplication 5.82
Karatsuba-variant Multiplication 4.60
GF (p) inverse 4.15
GF (pm) inverse 25.3
Ane EC addition 44.8
Ane EC doubling 52.4
Ane point multiplication 11.4 msec
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advantageous to use projective coordinates to represent elliptic curve points and thus
postpone eld inversions in the elliptic curve group operation until the end of the
computation. Consider the 500 MHz Alpha 21264, which has a fully-pipelined integer
multiplier [Com99]. This hardware improvement dramatically improves the time for
an extension eld multiplication from 0.34 sec to 0.18 sec, despite the fact that
our 21164A test system is clocked at 600 MHz while our 21264 test system runs at
only 500 MHz. This architectural improvement does not speed the Binary Extended
Euclidean Algorithm however, so the time for an extension eld inversion is only
slightly improved from 2.68 sec to 2.44 sec. In this case, the ratio of multiplication
to inversion time grows to 13.5. Thus, our best result on the 500 MHz Alpha 21264
of 0.75 msec for a full scalar multiplication is achieved using projective coordinates.
This result once again conrms our thesis that to achieve optimal performance for an
elliptic curve cryptosystem, one must tailor the choice of algorithms and nite elds
to match the underlying hardware.
Chapter 9
OEFs in Practice
When implementing cryptosystems in the real world, several concerns arise in addition
to high performance and hardness of the underlying problem. In this section, we
address two issues which must be resolved to use OEFs in a secure real-world system.
9.1 Key Validation
In practical usage of a public-key cryptosystem, two parties perform computations
in some mathematical structure such as a ring, eld, or elliptic curve. The two par-
ties can generally be assumed to be mutually distrustful. This presents a problem:
one party must unilaterally choose a mathematical structure in which computations
may be performed. In fact, an attacking party could choose a structure in which the
assumed hard problem isn’t very hard at all. For example, there are special cases
for which the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem can be transformed into an
easy problem, such as in the case where the number of points on the curve equals the
number of elements in the eld over which the curve is dened. Further, an attacker
could provide bogus parameters which do not dene the claimed mathematical struc-
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ture. For example, an attacker may be able to solve a discrete logarithm problem
more easily if she selects certain parameters [Gor93].
It is useful then to ask: what reasonable steps may be taken to ensure that
alleged parameters specifying an elliptic curve cryptosystem over an OEF are plau-
sible? In the following, let the eld be GF (pm), the eld polynomial be P (x), the
elliptic curve be y2  x3 + ax+ b and an elliptic curve point be W = (v; w):
1. Check that p is an odd prime rational integer.
2. Check that m is a positive integer and that P (x) is of degree m.
3. Check that P (x) is irreducible.
4. Check that v2  w3 + aw + b 2 GF (pm).
These simple tests allow a user to verify that parameters for an elliptic curve
cryptosystem dened over an OEF are valid.
9.2 Conversion from Field Elements to Integers
and Octet Strings
Many practical cryptosystems require a user to convert between eld elements and
integers and/or octet strings. For example, in real-world usage of the Die-Hellman
key exchange [DH76], users often perform some nite eld computations, then nd a
corresponding octet string to represent the result. This octet string can then be used
as input to a hash function, or as a key for a symmetric cipher.
In the case of GF (p) and GF (2m), the conversion is straightforward: simply
take the target computer’s binary representation of a eld element and treat it as a
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string of octets. In the OEF case, however, things are slightly more dicult.
Suppose a user chooses some p = 2n − c;m for her OEF. Then each element
of the eld can be represented in m computer words. However, for each word, there
will be only 2n − c possible values instead of 2n. Thus the number of possible octet
strings formed from the concatenation of the m computer words is reduced by cm
due to the representation.
To address this problem, a user may simply perform radix conversion arith-
metic to nd a \densely packed" octet string representation. Thus the eld element:
A(x) = am−1xm−1 +   + a2x2 + a1x+ a0
may be represented by the integer I dened by:
I = am−1pm−1 +    + a2p2 + a1p+ a0
The integer I will thus have a bit length of dm log2 pe: Assuming values for
pi are precomputed and stored, the eort required to compute I is essentially m− 1
subeld multiplications and m subeld additions. Thus the time to compute I is
negligible when compared to the time required to perform an elliptic curve point
multiplication.
To nd the element A(x), some simple radix conversion operations are re-
quired. Starting from r = m− 1 down to r = 0, simply divide I by pr, where r is the
corresponding coecient of A(x) desired. The quotient at each step will be the rth
coecient of A(x). After each step, set the new value of I to the remainder.
Chapter 10
OEF Construction and Statistics
In the above sections we have shown that OEFs can oer particular advantages in
arithmetic performance when compared with other approaches. It is useful, then, to
ask how to construct an OEF and how many OEFs exist of various types. It turns out
that OEF construction may be done in an ecient manner using a relatively simple
algorithm. We provide statistics on the number of OEFs that exist for various choices
of n, and tables of OEFs which may be used in applications.
10.1 Type II OEF Construction Algorithm
Constructing an OEF for a particular application is an essentially straightforward
process. Let n; c;m; and ! be positive rational integers. Then we require a prime
p = 2n c, an extension degree m, and a constant ! such that these parameters form
an irreducible binomial xm − ! over GF (p).
Theorem 1 gives us the necessary and sucient conditions on these parameters.
For simplicity of presentation, we present an algorithm to construct a Type II OEF,
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xing ! = 2. Even with this restriction, OEFs are plentiful. This algorithm is an
improvement over that found in [Bai98] since Algorithm 3 can be used to exhaustively
nd all Type II OEFs.
The algorithm proceeds by nding pseudo-Mersenne primes and then checking
possible extension degrees m for the existence of a binomial. For our application, word
size n will be chosen based on the attributes of the target microprocessor. Typical
microprocessor word sizes lie between 8 and 64 bits, while a commonly used upper
bound for eld orders used in elliptic curve cryptography is 2256. It suces for this
application, then, to search for m up to 32, allowing for the largest possible eld order
with the smallest typical word size.
We present results from the use of this algorithm to construct tables in the
Appendix. Let c and n be positive rational integers. Algorithm 3 nds OEFs with
primes of the form 2n− c; a trivial change nds OEFs with primes of the form 2n + c,
if such a eld is required. In addition, minor changes to this algorithm will produce
Type I OEFs or general OEFs.
A practical implementation of this algorithm would be greatly improved by
using sieve methods rather than simply testing consecutive integers for primality. The
algorithm is presented in this form for clarity.
The most time consuming part of this algorithm is the factorization of p− 1.
For our implementation which produced the results in the Appendix, we used trial
division with small integers of the form 1 (mod 6) to extract small factors and
Pollard’s Rho Method to recover the remaining factors. This factorization is needed
only to compute the order of 2. To our knowledge, it is an open problem to devise a
method to compute this order without the full factorization of p− 1.
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Algorithm 8 Type II Optimal Extension Field Construction Procedure
Require: n given, low, high bounds on bit length of eld order
Ensure: p, m dene a Type II Optimal Extension Field with eld order between 2low
and 2high.
c 1
for log2 c  b12nc do
p 2n − c
if p is prime then
factor p− 1
ord2  the order of 2 2 GF (p)
for m 2 to 32 do
if m  n  low and m  n  high then
BadMV alue 0
for each prime divisor d of m do
if d 6 j ord2 then
BadMV alue 1
Break
end if
end for
if BadMV alue = 0 then
if m  0 (mod 4) then
if p  1 (mod 4) then
return p;m
end if
else
return p;m
end if
end if
end if
end for
end if
c c+ 2
end for
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10.2 Statistics on the Number of OEFs
We implemented Algorithm 3 on a variety of high-end RISC workstations including
DEC Alphas and Sun Sparc Ultras, with an aim toward counting the number of
Type II OEFs of approximate order between 2130 and 2256. The results from this
computation are found in Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4. Each table lists subeld bitlengths
going down the column and extension degrees across the rows.
10.3 Statistics on the Number of Pseudo-Mersenne
Primes
Many interesting open questions exist in analytic number theory concerning the ex-
istence of primes in short intervals. We denote the number of primes not exceeding
x as (x). One result in [IP84] shows that
(x)− (x− x23=42) > (x23=42)=(100 log x): (10.1)
A more recent result due to R. Baker and G. Harman analyzes the interval (x) −
(x− x:535:::) [Rib96]. Cramer shows that the Extended Riemann Hypothesis implies
the dierence between a particular prime pn and the next consecutive prime number
is O(p1=2n log pn) [Rib96]. Of course, these results are only asymptotically true.
To exactly determine the number of pseudo-Mersenne primes, we need a result
concerning the intervals (2n) − (2n − 2(1=2)n) and (2n + 2(1=2)n) − (2n), about
which nothing appears to be known as of this writing [Kob98]. It is important to
note that this question concerning the number of primes in a short interval also arises
in choosing an elliptic curve over any nite eld for cryptographic use.
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Since there are no known results of this type which apply to our case of pseudo-
Mersenne primes, we explicitly computed the number of primes for 2n  c, where
7  n  58 and log2 c  b12nc. The results are found in Table A.1.
10.4 Tables of Type I and Type II OEFs
The appendix contains tables of OEFs for use in practical applications. Table A.5
provides all Type I OEFs for 7  n  61. For each choice of n and a sign for c, where
possible we provide three Type II OEFs, preferably with nm  160; 200; 240, respec-
tively, in Table A.6. We observe that due to the fast subeld multiplication available
with Type I OEFs, these oer computational advantages on many platforms when
compared to Type II OEFs. This is true since although a Type II OEF has ! = 2 and
thus implements the multiplications required for extension eld modular reduction
with shifts, a Type I OEF requires only one multiplication for each subeld multiply.
Since subeld multiplication is by far the most often used operation, speedups here
are most dramatic.
Chapter 11
Discussion
11.1 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the work on Optimal Extension Fields by introducing
an ecient algorithm for inversion. The use of this algorithm allows for an ane
representation of the elliptic curve points which is more ecient than the previously
reported projective space representation. In addition, we have provided formulas
for fast polynomial multiplication which are particularly suited to extension degrees
of the form 3i. Finally, we have included tables of OEFs for reference and use in
implementation.
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Table A.1: Number of Pseudo-Mersenne Primes, 2n  c; log2 c  b(n=2)c
n 2n − c 2n + c n 2n − c 2n + c
7 1 1 33 2886 2852
8 2 4 34 5667 5477
9 3 2 35 5379 5263
10 5 5 36 10413 10503
11 4 3 37 10197 10254
12 7 9 38 19799 19812
13 6 7 39 19461 19502
14 11 12 40 37798 37871
15 9 13 41 36743 36902
16 21 30 42 71805 72138
17 19 20 43 70257 70325
18 38 42 44 137313 137285
19 40 29 45 134641 134452
20 70 77 46 263004 263544
21 65 70 47 257295 258091
22 129 137 48 504634 504016
23 117 131 49 493785 494248
24 251 249 50 969072 967704
25 240 258 51 947752 948011
26 477 455 52 1863100 1860984
27 434 452 53 1826661 1826485
28 871 840 54 3586713 3585449
29 839 811 55 3521537 3520704
30 1578 1565 56 6920100 7131669
31 1527 1542 57 6794704 6792475
32 2931 2958 58 13351601 13351850
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Table A.2: Number of Type II OEFs of order between 2130 and 2256; 7  n  10
m= 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 32
n
7 1 1
8 3 1 2 3
9 1 1 1 1
10 1 3 1 1 1 1 3
Table A.3: Number of OEFs of order between 2130 and 2256; 11  n  18
m= 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
n
11 2 1 3 2 1 1
12 3 1 1 1 3 2 1
13 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
14 4 1 4 2 4 1 8 6
15 8 1 3 3 1 1 7
16 19 5 1 4 6 4 4 14
17 10 14 3 4 4 4 4 3
18 17 25 7 7 3 5 5
Tables 54
Table A.4: Number of Type II OEFs of order between 2130 and 2256; 19  n  55
m= 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
n
19 9 21 25 4 3 6 4
20 22 39 48 12 14 13
21 18 35 50 15 11 13
22 40 41 66 89 33 29
23 43 35 56 83 31 20
24 77 72 126 160 48
25 76 68 124 156 47
26 183 179 133 219 342
27 177 139 125 218 286
28 333 287 259 422 559
29 329 279 240 404
30 617 512 479 790
31 615 529 432 755
32 1180 946 824 1442
33 1424 1136 977 766
34 2813 2180 1857 1561
35 2636 2126 1755 1483
36 5154 4149 3359 2967
37 5095 4139 3429
38 9871 7911 6599
39 9749 7771 6380
40 18864 15179 12499
41 18533 14656 12286
42 36074 28817 23951
43 35215 27905
44 91499 68735 55042
45 89336 67300 53918
46 175514 131656 105347
47 172251 128937 102966
48 336066 252095 201375
49 329827 247247 197553
50 645703 483609 387502
51 315731 236628 189774
52 1241533 931675
53 1218801 913858
54 2391808 1792593
55 2347560 1760093
Tables 55
Table A.5: Type I OEFs for 7  n  61
n c m mn !
7 -1 21 147 3
7 -1 27 189 3
8 1 32 256 2
13 -1 13 169 2
13 -1 10 130 17
13 -1 14 182 17
13 -1 15 195 17
13 -1 18 234 17
16 1 16 256 2
17 -1 9 153 3
17 -1 10 170 3
17 -1 15 255 3
19 -1 7 133 3
19 -1 9 171 3
31 -1 6 186 7
31 -1 7 217 7
61 -1 3 183 37
Table A.6: Type II OEFs
n c p m nm n c p m nm
7 +3 131 25 175 33 -49 8589934543 7 231
7 +3 131 26 182 33 -301 8589934291 5 165
8 -5 251 25 200 33 -301 8589934291 6 198
8 -15 241 25 200 33 +29 8589934621 5 165
8 -15 241 27 216 33 +29 8589934621 6 198
8 +1 257 32 256 33 +35 8589934627 7 231
8 +15 271 25 200 34 -113 17179869071 5 170
8 +15 271 27 216 34 -113 17179869071 7 238
9 -3 509 16 144 34 -165 17179869019 6 204
9 +9 521 25 225 34 +153 17179869337 7 238
9 +11 523 18 162 34 +339 17179869523 6 204
9 +11 523 27 243 34 +417 17179869601 5 170
10 -3 1021 16 160 35 -31 34359738337 7 245
10 -3 1021 20 200 35 -61 34359738307 6 210
10 -11 1013 23 230 35 -499 34359737869 4 140
10 +7 1031 25 250 35 +53 34359738421 5 175
10 +27 1051 14 140 35 +53 34359738421 6 210
10 +27 1051 25 250 35 +53 34359738421 7 245
11 -19 2029 13 143 36 -117 68719476619 6 216
11 -19 2029 16 176 36 -189 68719476547 7 252
11 -19 2029 18 198 36 -243 68719476493 4 144
11 +5 2053 16 176 36 +117 68719476853 4 144
11 +5 2053 18 198 36 +117 68719476853 6 216
11 +21 2069 22 242 36 +175 68719476911 7 252
12 -3 4093 16 192 37 -123 137438953349 4 148
12 -3 4093 18 216 37 -141 137438953331 5 185
12 -39 4057 13 156 37 -201 137438953271 5 185
12 +15 4111 15 180 37 +9 137438953481 5 185
12 +37 4133 16 192 37 +29 137438953501 4 148
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12 +63 4159 21 252 37 +29 137438953501 5 185
13 -1 8191 13 169 38 -45 274877906899 6 228
13 -13 8179 18 234 38 -107 274877906837 4 152
13 -21 8171 19 247 38 -153 274877906791 5 190
13 +17 8209 19 247 38 +7 274877906951 5 190
13 +27 8219 14 182 38 +13 274877906957 4 152
13 +29 8221 12 156 38 +117 274877907061 6 228
14 -3 16381 12 168 39 -19 549755813869 4 156
14 -3 16381 14 196 39 -67 549755813821 5 195
14 -3 16381 18 252 39 -91 549755813797 6 234
14 +67 16451 14 196 39 +23 549755813911 5 195
14 +69 16453 12 168 39 +45 549755813933 4 156
14 +69 16453 18 252 39 +149 549755814037 6 234
15 -19 32749 12 180 40 -195 1099511627581 4 160
15 -19 32749 16 240 40 -195 1099511627581 5 200
15 -75 32693 11 165 40 -195 1099511627581 6 240
15 +3 32771 10 150 40 +15 1099511627791 5 200
15 +21 32789 14 210 40 +141 1099511627917 4 160
15 +21 32789 16 240 40 +141 1099511627917 6 240
16 -15 65521 9 144 41 -21 2199023255531 5 205
16 -15 65521 13 208 41 -75 2199023255477 4 164
16 -15 65521 15 240 41 -133 2199023255419 6 246
16 +45 65581 10 160 41 +125 2199023255677 4 164
16 +45 65581 12 192 41 +197 2199023255749 6 246
16 +45 65581 15 240 41 +299 2199023255851 5 205
17 -13 131059 9 153 42 -11 4398046511093 4 168
17 -31 131041 13 221 42 -53 4398046511051 5 210
17 -61 131011 15 255 42 -333 4398046510771 5 210
17 +29 131101 9 153 42 +75 4398046511179 6 252
17 +29 131101 12 204 42 +87 4398046511191 5 210
17 +99 131171 13 221 42 +165 4398046511269 4 168
18 -11 262133 13 234 43 -67 8796093022141 4 172
18 -35 262109 11 198 43 -117 8796093022091 5 215
18 -93 262051 9 162 43 +29 8796093022237 4 172
18 +3 262147 9 162 43 +293 8796093022501 5 215
18 +9 262153 11 198 43 +603 8796093022811 5 215
18 +93 262237 13 234 44 -495 17592186043921 5 220
19 -19 524269 8 152 44 -539 17592186043877 4 176
19 -19 524269 12 228 44 -597 17592186043819 3 132
19 -27 524261 10 190 44 +21 17592186044437 3 132
19 +21 524309 8 152 44 +21 17592186044437 4 176
19 +53 524341 12 228 44 +55 17592186044471 5 220
19 +81 524369 13 247 45 -55 35184372088777 3 135
20 -3 1048573 8 160 45 -81 35184372088751 5 225
20 -3 1048573 12 240 45 -139 35184372088693 4 180
20 -5 1048571 10 200 45 +59 35184372088891 5 225
20 +13 1048589 8 160 45 +165 35184372088997 4 180
20 +33 1048609 11 220 45 +179 35184372089011 3 135
20 +57 1048633 9 180 46 -21 70368744177643 3 138
21 -19 2097133 8 168 46 -333 70368744177331 5 230
21 -19 2097133 12 252 46 -635 70368744177029 4 184
21 -61 2097091 10 210 46 +127 70368744177791 5 230
21 +59 2097211 10 210 46 +165 70368744177829 3 138
21 +77 2097229 8 168 46 +165 70368744177829 4 184
21 +77 2097229 12 252 47 -115 140737488355213 4 188
22 -3 4194301 9 198 47 -127 140737488355201 5 235
Tables 57
22 -27 4194277 8 176 47 -541 140737488354787 3 141
22 -57 4194247 7 154 47 +5 140737488355333 3 141
22 +15 4194319 9 198 47 +5 140737488355333 4 188
22 +85 4194389 8 176 47 +273 140737488355601 5 235
22 +85 4194389 11 242 48 -59 281474976710597 4 192
23 -27 8388581 10 230 48 -93 281474976710563 3 144
23 -61 8388547 9 207 48 -165 281474976710491 5 240
23 -157 8388451 7 161 48 +61 281474976710717 4 192
23 +11 8388619 7 161 48 +75 281474976710731 3 144
23 +11 8388619 9 207 48 +235 281474976710891 5 240
23 +15 8388623 11 253 49 -81 562949953421231 5 245
24 -3 16777213 8 192 49 -123 562949953421189 4 196
24 -63 16777153 7 168 49 -139 562949953421173 3 147
24 -75 16777141 10 240 49 +69 562949953421381 4 196
24 +75 16777291 6 144 49 +69 562949953421381 5 245
24 +75 16777291 10 240 49 +191 562949953421503 3 147
24 +117 16777333 8 192 50 -27 1125899906842597 4 200
25 -61 33554371 6 150 50 -51 1125899906842573 3 150
25 -61 33554371 10 250 50 -113 1125899906842511 5 250
25 -91 33554341 8 200 50 +159 1125899906842783 3 150
25 +35 33554467 6 150 50 +205 1125899906842829 4 200
25 +69 33554501 8 200 50 +337 1125899906842961 5 250
25 +69 33554501 10 250 51 -139 2251799813685109 4 204
26 -27 67108837 8 208 51 -237 2251799813685011 5 255
26 -45 67108819 6 156 51 -397 2251799813684851 3 153
26 -45 67108819 9 234 51 +21 2251799813685269 4 204
26 +15 67108879 9 234 51 +65 2251799813685313 3 153
26 +69 67108933 6 156 51 +165 2251799813685413 4 204
26 +69 67108933 8 208 52 -183 4503599627370313 3 156
27 -79 134217649 9 243 52 -395 4503599627370101 4 208
27 -187 134217541 6 162 52 -635 4503599627369861 4 208
27 -231 134217497 7 189 52 +21 4503599627370517 3 156
27 +45 134217773 8 216 52 +21 4503599627370517 4 208
27 +53 134217781 6 162 52 +37 4503599627370533 4 208
27 +53 134217781 9 243 53 -145 9007199254740847 3 159
28 -57 268435399 7 196 53 -315 9007199254740677 4 212
28 -165 268435291 6 168 53 -339 9007199254740653 4 212
28 -165 268435291 9 252 53 +5 9007199254740997 4 212
28 +3 268435459 6 168 53 +41 9007199254741033 3 159
28 +3 268435459 9 252 53 +341 9007199254741333 4 212
28 +37 268435493 8 224 54 -33 18014398509481951 3 162
29 -3 536870909 7 203 54 -131 18014398509481853 4 216
29 -3 536870909 8 232 54 -195 18014398509481789 4 216
29 -43 536870869 6 174 54 +159 18014398509482143 3 162
29 +39 536870951 5 145 54 +373 18014398509482357 4 216
29 +39 536870951 7 203 54 +477 18014398509482461 4 216
29 +117 536871029 8 232 55 -55 36028797018963913 3 165
30 -35 1073741789 7 210 55 -67 36028797018963901 4 220
30 -35 1073741789 8 240 55 -99 36028797018963869 4 220
30 -83 1073741741 5 150 55 +11 36028797018963979 3 165
30 +7 1073741831 5 150 55 +461 36028797018964429 4 220
30 +7 1073741831 7 210 55 +629 36028797018964597 4 220
30 +85 1073741909 8 240 56 -27 72057594037927909 4 224
31 -19 2147483629 6 186 56 -57 72057594037927879 3 168
31 -19 2147483629 8 248 56 -147 72057594037927789 4 224
31 -85 2147483563 7 217 56 +81 72057594037928017 3 168
Tables 58
31 +45 2147483693 8 248 56 +177 72057594037928113 3 168
31 +209 2147483857 7 217 56 +201 72057594037928137 3 168
31 +245 2147483893 6 186 57 -13 144115188075855859 3 171
32 -5 4294967291 5 160 57 -195 144115188075855677 4 228
32 -17 4294967279 7 224 57 -363 144115188075855509 4 228
32 -99 4294967197 8 256 57 +35 144115188075855907 3 171
32 +15 4294967311 5 160 57 +141 144115188075856013 4 228
32 +61 4294967357 8 256 57 +189 144115188075856061 4 228
32 +75 4294967371 6 192 57 +701 144115188075856573 4 228
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